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ABSTRACT 
 
Through a study of the effects of the Vietnam Wars on Vietnam, it becomes apparent 
that post-war political, social, cultural and economic instability, struggle and 
transformation, was directly related to the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
Vietnamese people. The relationship between the two Vietnam Wars will be considered, 
particularly the frustration of unification aims by the unexpected outcome of the first war 
and the importance of maintaining the enchantment of the population in the post-war 
environment. 
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THE BATTLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE: THE EFFECTS OF 
THE VIETNAM WARS ON VIETNAM 
 
‘Waging a war is simple, but running a country is very difficult.’i Whilst overly simple in itself, this sentiment 
encapsulates the struggle and transformation which characterised post-war Vietnam. Moreover, it implies the 
centrality of a battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese people, revealing ideological tensions at its 
basis. The loss of life, land and infrastructure following the first war, coupled with the Geneva settlement’s 
division of Vietnam in 1954 and the subsequent mass exodus of people from the North to the South, not only 
frustrated the unification aims of the Viet Minh but also complicated the process of post-war reconstruction. So, 
in the outcome and effects of the first war lay the foundations of the second. However, this succeeding conflict 
was to cause far more extensive and repercussive devastation that its predecessor, creating post-war political, 
social, cultural and economic instability, struggle and transformation. 
 
The First Vietnam War emerged from the complex situation at the end of World War II; the French reoccupied 
Vietnam and the Viet Minh sought to continue a struggle for independence from colonialism, in which Ho Chi 
Minh had been instrumental. As a result of the war, the French were defeated (at Dien Bien Phu) and withdrew 
from Vietnam. Just as the history leading up to the commencement of the First Vietnam War, and the nature of 
this nine year battle cannot be easily summarised, so too are its outcomes and effects complex, interrelated and 
perpetuating.ii 
 
Whilst the Vietnamese had won the battle against the French they had certainly not won the war when it came to 
‘the political landscape of the hearts and minds of the population.’iii Compounding the implications of this 
failure to unify the Vietnamese population through ideology was the 1954 Geneva Conference, a meeting 
designed to resolve the future of Vietnam. It was decided that the French were to withdraw and that the country 
was to be divided at the 17th parallel, demarcating communist governed North and Saigon-based South; the 
partitioning of the country was designed to be temporary and elections were to be conducted in 1956. However, 
the United States – dissatisfied with this notion of a temporary division, because of their increasing fear of 
communism (‘the Domino Effect’) – wished to turn the 17th parallel into a legitimate border.iv Northern Vietnam 
too was angered by the division, though for differing reasons. In fighting the colonial power of the French the 
Viet Minh had hoped to gain independence for all of Vietnam; in effect, however, a rival state had now been 
created, distinguished by the American backing of South Vietnam. Thus, Geneva was a paradoxical peace 
settlement; in leaving so much unanswered and unfinished it effectively ‘left the door opened to further wars.’v 
In the dissatisfaction of the United States and the frustrated aims of what was now Northern Vietnam – and their 
associated social and political implications – lay the possibility of future conflict. 
 
The immediate effects of the First Vietnam War encompassed loss of life, land and infrastructure. Vietnamese 
casualties in the war are estimated at 500,000 – 800,000 and sites of production were shut down, deserted or 
destroyed, as were railroads, roads and ports. Northern Vietnam suffered the brunt of such land and 
infrastructure destruction, compounded by (and interconnected with) the exodus of people from the North after 
the Geneva settlement.vi As a result of these significant losses and damage, the nature and outcome of the war 
created related economic, social and political instability – themselves interrelated – which in turn became 
catalysts of the Second Vietnam War.vii 
 
The poor economic position of Vietnam as a result of Japanese occupation during World War II was 
exacerbated by the First Vietnam War.viii In particular, Northern Vietnam faced a crumbled economy whose 
foundations – industrial, natural and human – were significantly damaged in its aftermath. As can be expected, 
the loss of a significant labour force was a crucial absence in attempting to re-establish an efficient economy.ix 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to rebuild, North Vietnam sought to eliminate the class of landlords, reinvigorate the 
landless and poorer peasants, and in turn increase crop surpluses, by implementing policies of ‘land confiscation 
and redistribution’ (1953-1956). Whilst, as a result of such measures, rice production increased by two thirds in 
two years, many Vietnamese were incorrectly categorised, victimised and even executed. Despite this and a 
resultant peasant uprising (1957), the government proceeded to collectivise the agricultural economy (1958-
1959).x However, in what seems to be a cycle of improvement and decline in the interwar period, productivity 
remained low as a result of a lack of industrialised machinery, which had been both destroyed in the war and 
forfeited in the French withdrawal. Whilst economic assistance from China and the Soviet Union aimed to boost 
economic measures throughout the period, the Northern Vietnamese economy (and society) never really became 
sufficiently stable, remaining ‘poor, industrially underdeveloped [and] peasant-based.’xi Additionally, by default 
of a persistent concern to unify Vietnam through liberating the South, any progress made was significantly 
counteracted by the draining of manpower and resources. It was this aim of unification – foremost in the war 
against the colonial power of the French – which was to catalyse the makings of a second war already set in 
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motion. Contrastingly, though not staunchly engaging in land reform practices to address increased rates of 
tenancy or the unequal distribution of land, the economy of Southern Vietnam remained stable through an 
increasing dependence on American assistance.xii Instead Saigon was concerned primarily with anti-communist 
policies.xiii Thus, the economic situations in North and South Vietnam were markedly contrasted as a result of 
the effects of the First Vietnam War; whereas the North had sustained significant physical losses, the South had 
benefited from the intervention of the United States as a result of the Geneva settlement. 
 
Social instability in Vietnam was connected with economic and political conditions, embodied in the 
displacement of persons during and after the war. During the time of ‘free exchange’ provided by the Geneva 
agreement an estimated 900,000 people fled south, with only 130,000 Viet Minh troops and supporters 
migrating north.xiv Somewhat paradoxically, in the wake of this event, whereas North Vietnam had attempted to 
gain popular support amongst the peasants through its land, education and health reform practices,xv South 
Vietnam was preoccupied with maintaining the political allegiance of wealthier land owning classes. However, 
these differing practices and attitudes are not able to be directly correlated with a particular level of social 
stability; not only was its achievement innately linked with the prevailing economic situation, but politics – 
which was now at the core of the conflict – was always in such a state of flux that to maintain social stability 
was near impossible. 
 
Political instability in Vietnam stemmed from Geneva’s 17th parallel provision, which created a tentative 
geopolitical division. Accordingly so, it is evident that a lack of political coherence amongst the people – 
exemplified in the exodus from the North where the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people had not been won – was 
directly related to the eruption of the Second Vietnam War, for it served to militarily and forcefully achieve this 
political, as well as cultural/ethnic, unity.xvi In South Vietnam the intervention of the United States resulted in 
the installation of anti-communist leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, who responded brazenly to communist dissidents, 
using military force to place an estimated 50,000 in re-education camps and execute a further 12,000 between 
1955and 1959.xvii The increasing economic and political strength of the South Vietnamese government 
frustrated the hopes of Ho Chi Minh. His decision to have a number of Viet Minh remain in South Vietnam in 
order to garner support for the communist North, in preparation for the proposed elections which he had hoped 
would result in his election as leader of a unified Vietnam, had been negated by the actions of Diem.xviii From 
mid-1957 the Viet Congxix aimed to ‘secure the allegiance of the peasants [of South Vietnam] and destroy the 
credibility of the Diem regime’ by engaging in the assassination of officials and the redistribution of land seized 
from landlords, to peasants.xx Consequently, the central aim of South Vietnamese government action at this time 
was to more definitely break the ties of guerrilla communists residing in the South with the South Vietnamese 
population, and to in turn quell any infiltration. American assistance to South Vietnam, in the form of both 
equipment and training, peaked in 1957-1958, and Diem sought to organise the countryside into larger villages 
surrounded by various fortifications (agrovilles).xxi However, in time the Viet Cong exploited the increasing 
disenchantment of the population with Diem and by 1962 controlled (or at least influenced) approximately two 
thirds of Southern Vietnam, reducing the government’s stranglehold on its people.xxii Coupled with the 
fluctuating state of the Northern Vietnamese economy and society, it was decided at a meeting of the Vietnam 
Worker’s Party that ‘the fundamental path of development for the revolution in South Vietnam [was] that of 
violent struggle.’xxiii Nevertheless, Duiker debates the origin of the war: 
 
[It] was not the result of a deliberate policy decision by… Northern Vietnam, but was the consequence 
of Diem’s own repressive measures in the South – measures which forced desperate peasants and Viet 
Minh supporters to take up arms to defend themselves…. [I]t was not Hanoi which started the war, but 
Saigon. And it was not…an invasion from the north, but a civil war in the south.xxiv 
 
Though musing upon the varied interpretation of historical events, what this summation achieves most 
pertinently is the enunciation of the way in which economic, social and political instability experienced as a 
result of the first war, created the conditions for a second.xxv 
 
The Second Vietnam War was an extension of the first; compounded by the complexion of the Cold War it 
represented the culmination of unresolved social and political relations. What perhaps connects the two wars 
most closely is the central aim of liberating and unifying Vietnam. Whilst this aim was lost in the process of the 
first war, it was fervently reclaimed in its aftermath, the second war ending with the capture of Saigon by the 
Viet Cong in April 1975. As a result of, and despite this success, postwar Vietnam was characterised by 
significant political, social, cultural and economic struggle and transformation. 
 
As with the first war, the immediate effects of the Second Vietnam War encompassed significant loss of life, 
land and infrastructure, which were needed for post-war reconstruction. Casualty estimates of both North and 
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South are placed between 3 and 4 million, including 1.5 to 2 million civilian deaths.xxvi Additionally, Young 
asserts: 
 
[I]n the south, 9,000 out of 15,000 hamlets, 25 million acres of farmland [and] 12 million acres of forest 
were destroyed… 1.5 million farm animals had been killed…. [A]ll of the six industrial cities in the 
North…provincial districts and towns…4,000 out of 5,800 agricultural communities… [and] roads, 
railroads and ports [had been decimated in the war].xxvii 
 
The extensive use of air bombing technology (8 to 15 million tonnes), mines and chemical warfare heightened 
the extent of this destruction. In fact, unexploded mines and the toxicity of 72 million litres of ‘Agent Orange’ 
continued to wreak havoc even after the war had ended.xxviii It is not surprising then that the achievement of 
peace in post-war Vietnam was complicated by ‘recover[y] from the physical damage and psychological 
bitterness caused by the war.’xxix 
 
First and foremost, the post-war period in Vietnam was characterised by political struggle and transformation, as 
a result of the fact that ideological conflict had catalysed the war. However, it is important to reiterate the 
significance of winning the war in terms of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, for the increased control and 
influence which North Vietnam came to possess over members of the South Vietnamese population in the early 
1960s was instrumental.xxx Consequently, ‘the communists did not outfight, they simply out-politicked their 
enemies.’xxxi It must be noted that the Second Vietnam War had not ended in the way the North had predicted; 
rather than succeeding in a revolution of the South and then gradually engaging in political and economic 
unification, the unexpected conclusion to the war prompted Hanoi to ‘embark on a program of rapid unification 
and socialist transformation.’xxxii Power was quickly centralised in the South from Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh 
City) and the country was formally renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, the creation of 
communist order was complicated by the necessity to remake ‘nature, history, geography, and human 
psychology…in the spirit of a military campaign’ – a point which was in conflict with the assurances which had 
been provided to the South Vietnamese population that their assets and finances were secure.xxxiii Thus, in 
engaging in social, cultural and economic transformations in order to enact socialist rule, the new Vietnamese 
government was to encounter significant struggle and experience a mix of success and failure. 
 
In the aftermath of war, social and cultural transformation in Vietnam was directly connected to the creation of a 
socialist state. However, the social makeup of Vietnam had been altered by the war; there was a demographic 
imbalance due to the number of men killed, 879,000 children had been orphaned, one million people widowed 
and 181,000 disabled. The rural-urban/urban-rural movement of people and the exodus of approximately seven 
million refugees – frustrated by the extensive devastation – worsened this impoverishment and 
fragmentation.xxxiv Land reforms were the first to be instituted, but whilst the North had achieved support by 
relaxing its control of the land during the war, it reneged on its actions in the unexpected aftermath. 
Additionally, Vietnamese provinces were redefined by the communist government in accordance with the 
Leninist belief that an ‘integrated economic machine’ required regions to be defined by scientific criteria rather 
than historical notions.xxxv Further to these changes to the physical landscape, the government was also 
concerned with ‘remov[ing] the legacy of Western influence in Southern Vietnam and sow[ing] the seeds of a 
new socialist culture.’xxxvi Whilst it was crucial to achieve this change in order to effectively unify Vietnam, the 
government was also mindful that changes needed to be gradual and moderate as the enchantment of the 
population was necessary for key economic and political measures. The education system was transformed into 
‘a vehicle for building the communist citizen[;]’ teachers were retrained and classrooms were stocked with 
Marxist-oriented textbooks, camps were set up to re-educate former soldiers and civil servants, and a campaign 
launched to confiscate American paraphernalia.xxxvii Additionally, the government aimed to create a more 
egalitarian society by integrating tribal minorities, permitting freedom of religion and strengthening the role of 
women in society. However, fervent nationalist goals and attitudes are a notable absence from the social and 
cultural reforms in the post-war period; perhaps it is this which can account in part for the fundamental rigidity 
of post-war political and economic measures.xxxviii 
 
As a result of post-war political and social struggle, Vietnam was also characterised by related economic 
struggle and transformation. After 1975 Vietnam’s population continued to increase at the same time as foreign 
aid was declining, the reality of the country’s economic situation becoming apparent in this absence.xxxix 
Furthermore, the damage caused to Vietnam’s industrial, natural and human economic foundations resulted in a 
significant production decrease, let alone of taxable surpluses.xl The rapidity with which the communist 
government began to implement economic measures aimed at establishing communist order was in direct 
contrast to the assurances it had provided the South Vietnamese population. Within months a changeover to 
socialist currency had been organised and citizens had just three days to make exchanges and, in 1978 industry 
and commerce were nationalised, and agriculture was collectivised. However, these measures were largely 
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unsuccessful, hampered by the fact that, as a result of the war, those who best understood the rural system 
(communists in the South) had been killed, and that the sacking and compensation of landlords by the 
Americans had paved the way for an emergent class of capitalist peasants unwilling to participate in communist 
cooperatives.xli Thus, the desired economic results were not achieved with barely even half the population active 
members of the cooperatives; such inefficiency was attributed to the hostility of peasant farmers in the South.xlii 
In reference to this, Owen argues that the purpose of a communist economy seemed to be at odds with the 
means by which such an institution was to be achieved; the state was the ‘necessary agent of the reforms’ which 
aimed to ‘restrict arbitrary state power over the economy.’xliii In a response which did nothing to ease these 
negative impressions, the government kept dissidents under close surveillance or sent them to re-education 
camps where conditions were extremely poor. The resentment which was building within the state increased 
with refugees fleeing and revolts being organised as a result of the government’s 1978 decision to remove the 
private economy. Such doubts were fuelled further when, as a result of the decreased labour force and 
government disenchantment, industrial production significantly decreased and food rationing was introduced. 
Nevertheless, Duiker simply maintains that ‘the regime had tried to accomplish too much, too soon,’ its situation 
worsened by the shambolic state of its foreign relations.xliv 
 
Vietnam’s internal political instability and isolation in the aftermath of war affected the country’s foreign 
relations. Most obviously, Vietnam’s relationship with the United States had altered significantly; however, the 
Vietnamese government’s newfound political confidence in the aftermath of victory did not serve their 
relationship with Cambodia or China well.xlv In fact, Vietnam’s expression of interest to engage in a ‘special 
relationship’ with both countries was ill received by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia who interpreted the offer 
as a disguised attempt to assert authority and so responded with military attacks along the border. China, whilst 
not considering Vietnam an immediate threat, was concerned that Vietnam may attempt to assert authority over 
the territory of Indochina.xlvi Vietnam’s attempts to resolve the error in communication with Cambodia were not 
successful and, when it became clear that China was supporting Pol Pot in their retaliation, the Vietnamese 
invaded the country, overthrowing the seat of power and installing a new government (January 1979). The 
invasion was brutal, with many civilians being placed into slave-labour, tortured or killed; China, fearful that 
Vietnam may expand further issued its own attack on the Chinese/Vietnam border, which damaged much rural 
land and infrastructure (February 1979). Similar fears, based on the 1960s ‘Domino Theory,’ were sparked 
across Southeast Asia and the Western world.xlvii Thus, Vietnam needed to drastically reassess its priorities, or 
risk both internal and external turmoil. The gradual worsening of internal crises in the early 1980s prompted the 
relaxation of socialist reforms and the implementation of the Doi Moi policy (1986) to stimulate 
productivity.xlviii This policy was immediately successful in that it boosted both production and citizen moral; 
however, Duiker maintains that the regime’s cautiousness was just as questionable as post-war fervency.xlix 
Additionally, Vietnam was preoccupied with war in Cambodia and against China, which drained manpower and 
resources, and was politically isolated from former allies (the Soviet Union and China) as well the United States 
in the aftermath of defeat.l Alternately, ‘it is in the common interest today to help bring the Vietnamese people 
out of their isolation and bring about the creation of a prosperous and secure Vietnam, able to cooperate fully in 
the affairs of the region.’li 
 
No war, no victory, is ever simple, and yet the struggle to rebuild Vietnam – and to rebuild it with a socialist 
inflection – surpassed the wars itself in the ‘strategic predicament’ it created.lii The unification aims of the Viet 
Minh had been frustrated by the outcome of the first war, setting in motion the possibility of future, 
ideologically based conflict. Thus, the extensive and repercussive devastation caused by the second war, the 
government’s hurried implementation of socialist practices and the lack of emphasis on nationalist goals, 
contributed to the political, social, cultural and economic instability, struggle and transformation of Vietnam in 
the aftermath of war. The battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese people was clearly a war which 
persisted long after the decisive physical victories and pervaded all facets of Vietnamese society in the post-war 
period. 
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